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THE "HIGHER LAW"
DOCTRINE IN BRACTON
AND ST. THOMAS
CHARLES M. WHELAN, S.J.*

T HE DUE

PROCESS clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amendments
reflect the higher law tradition on which the American nation
was founded. The Declaration of Independence speaks of the laws of
nature, and of nature's God; the Constitution speaks of due process.
In both documents we find written into the American tradition the concept of an order normative for purely positive laws, an order not dependent for its existence or justification on the will of any human legislator. This concept of a higher law has an ancient history, reaching
not only to Greece and Rome, but to Egypt, Israel, Assyria, and Babylonia. In the course of its history, the basic norm of this higher law has
been variously identified: for Hammurabi and Moses, it was divine
revelation; for Cicero and Locke it was nature and right reason; for
Mr. Justice Cardozo, it was "the scheme of ordered liberty" fundamental
in Anglo-American legal tradition.
This doctrine of the higher law has been the subject of intense discussion and scholarly research in American legal circles. It has importance for our constitutional law, our history, and our theories of jurisprudence. It seems appropriate, therefore, to investigate this doctrine
as it appears in one of the first and greatest monuments in the AngloAmerican legal tradition, Henry of Bracton's De legibus et consuetudinibus Angliae. Because the higher law doctrine is often identified with
the natural law doctrine, it also seems appropriate to compare Bracton
with one of the great natural law theorists, St. Thomas Aquinas. The
comparison seems all the more appropriate since they were contemporaries. Bracton, however, was a judge; and Thomas a theologian. The
point of the comparison, therefore, will be simply their agreements and
disagreements, not their relative merits.
* A.B., LL.B., LL.M. Adjunct Professor, Georgetown University Law Center.
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One word of caution is necessary. In
studying higher law doctrines, we must distinguish between those which are elaborated without regard to the possibility of
enforcement by human institutions, and
those which are intimately connected with
such enforcement, such as the American
doctrine of judicial review. Haines, for
example, in discussing the significance of
ideas of a fundamental law in early English law, cites Plucknett as an author who
insists that "there is no substantial evidence in the medieval period to support
the doctrine of a supreme fundamental law
in England." 1 But Plucknett has subsequently made it clear that his position is
limited to the denial of the power of English courts to enforce a higher law against
parliamentary enactments. He says:
Of course, there is no doubt that the mediaeval mind would never think of postulating the absolute sovereignty of Parliament or State. The whole scheme of things
in the middle ages was based upon the assumption that municipal law derived its
force from divine law; but we do not find
in mediaeval English cases any decisions
which clearly hold that a statute is void
because it contravenes some fundamental
2
principle.
Doctrines like judicial review, the right
of rebellion, or papal power to absolve
from allegiance, are not essential to an
intelligible theory of higher law. Indeed, it
would seem in at least one respect that
insistence on human institutions capable of
enforcing the higher law is contrary to the
heart of the doctrine itself. Juvenal's mordant question, "Who will guard the guard-

ians?" pinpoints the problem precisely.
Legislatures can tyrannize as well as kings,
and courts as well as legislatures. The true
value of a higher law doctrine is to remind men that all human acts are subject
to moral judgment, not to enable men to
substitute new guardians for old.
In Bracton and St. Thomas, therefore,
our attention will be devoted to the bases
of their higher law doctrines rather than
the methods or institutions by which they
may have hoped to see it enforced on
earth. As we shall see, they were not unconcerned with the problem of enforcement; neither did they make it the central
issue in their higher law doctrines.
Bracton: Life and Works
Much of Bracton's life is unknown to
us. His very name is the subject of some
dispute; there are more than sixty variants
in the manuscripts.3 The place and date of
his birth are uncertain. Kantorowicz argues
persuasively for a year close to 1200, and
for Devon as the place.4 We do know that
Bracton was an ecclesiastic, for he was
rector of Combe in Teignhead in 1259, of
Bideford in 1261, and archdeacon of
Barnstaple in 1264. When he died in
1268, he had prebends at Exeter and
Bosham, and was chancellor of Exeter Cathedral. His ecclesiastical status did not,
of course, interfere with a judicial career.
In 1245 he was a justice in Eyre. The following year his circuit included Yorkshire,
Northumberland, Westmoreland, Cumberland, and Lancaster. From 1248 to 1268,
he was judge of assize for the southwestern
3 1

' HAINES,

AMERICAN

DOCTRINE

OF

JUDICIAL

SUPREMACY 32 (2d ed. 1932).
2 PLUCKNETr,

A

CONCISE

HISTORY

COMMON LAW 336 (5th ed. 1956).

OF

THE

BRACTON, DE LEGIBUS

ET CONSUETUDINI-

BUS ANGLIAE 101, n.1

(ed. Woodbine 1915)
[hereinafter cited as WOODBINE].

4 KANTOROwICZ,
15 (1941).

BRACTONIAN

PROBLEMS

14-

8
counties, and from 1248 to 1257 he heard
pleas before the king himself. It was during
this period that he came into possession of
the plea rolls of Raleigh and Pateshull, from
which he compiled the Note Book.5
The Note Book is the first English casebook. Some 2000 cases from the first
twenty-four years of Henry III's reign were
carefully selected by Bracton from the rolls
of the common bench, of pleas before the
king himself, and from certain Eyre rolls.
In numerous instances, Bracton annotated
the cases. The original manuscript of the
Note Book does not identify Bracton as
the compiler and annotator, but the careful research and argumentation of F. W.
Maitland has established the attribution.6
With the help of the Note Book, Bracton
set about writing the first systematic manual of English law. Glanvill's De Legibus
et Consuetudinibus Regni Angliae had appeared about 1187, but it was concerned
solely with procedure in the royal courts
and the common law had developed immensely since its appearance. 7 That Brac-
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ton had Glanvill's treatise before him while
he composed his own De Legibus is evident not only from the similarity of the
titles, but from the close correspondence
of their opening sentence. Both insist that
two things are necessary for the king:
arma et leges. The same idea, of course,
is also found in Azo, on whom Bracton
relied so heavily;" but the choice of this
idea as the first in the treatise seems more
readily explicable in terms of a reliance on
Glanvill.9
In addition to the Note Book, Glanvill,
and Azo's two Summae, Bracton also had
at his disposal the plea rolls of Raleigh and
Pateshull, the Leges Edwardi, the Decreturn and a collection of Decretals, a Bible,
some works of Ovid, the institutes, at least
the first nine books of the Code and two
sections of the Digest. He may also have
had a version of the Anglo-Saxon laws,
Tancred's Summa de Matrimonio, Barnard
of Pavia's Summa Decretalium, and a work
of Raymond de Penafort.10
CIETY IN THE EARLY MIDDLE AGES (1066-1307)

5These details of Bracton's life are taken
from
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inspired Hubert Walter to compose it; the
manuscripts merely say that it was composed
in the time of Glanvill." STENTON, ENGLISH SO-

40 (2d ed. 1952), suggests that "Glanvill" could
have been written only with Henry II's "consent
and goodwill, if not at his direct command."
8 MAITLAND, BRACTON AND Azo (8 Selden Society 1894).
9 Glanvill, of course, had modelled his introduction on the preface to Justinian's Institutes
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however, betray the original thinking of each
author. The Institutes have Imperatoriam maiestatem ("the imperial majesty"); for this, Glanvill has substituted Regiam potestatem ("royal
authority"); and Bracton writes: In rege qui
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Bracton borrowed the tripartite plan of
his work from Justinian's Institutes: persons, things, actions and obligations. This
use of a Roman model was a deliberate attempt on Bracton's part to give a rational
structure to English law, which had hitherto been accumulating haphazardly, as laws
and customs generally do in rapidly developing legal systems. The choice of a
Roman model and the use of Roman authorities to fill the gaps in the laws and
customs of his times brought Bracton under sharp criticism from Maine. The great
historian, indeed, asserted that Bracton
had attempted to fob off Romanism as
genuine English Law." Maitland forcefully dissented, but rescued Bracton only by
making him a "poor, an uninstructed Romanist."' 12 Kantorowicz attempted to rehabilitate Bracton as a civilian, without
13
impugning his fidelity to English Law.
Plucknett agrees with Holdsworth that not
"all Bracton's law is English in substance . . ." and that it is "because his
treatise has given to English law at least
one authority upon many matters which
were outside the routine of the practising
lawyer of the thirteenth century that his
influence upon the history of English law
has been so great." 14 As we shall see later,
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Bracton's Romanism colored not only his
treatment of bailments (which was destined
to have such importance centuries later in
Coggs v. Bernard) but his concept of the
higher law as well.
Bracton died in 1268 without completing his great treatise. Unfinished as it was,
it yet won instant favor; of the forty-six
surviving manuscripts, all date from before
1400.15 Owing to the great length of the
treatise, it was rapidly summarized by Gilbert de Thornton late in the thirteenth
century and in the works known as Britton
and Fleta during the reign of Edward I.
The immediate influence of Bracton's
treatise was profound but short-lived. Maitland doubts "whether any book written
by a medieval Englishman that was as
bulky as Bracton's and was not a book of
devotion or of theology was more popular
or more often transcribed." 16 Nevertheless, his popularity suffered an eclipse beginning about 1350. He was resurrected
in the sixteenth century, through the printing press, in "a stately volume, perhaps
the best printed law book we have ever
had."' 17 Without doubt, the most impressive moment in Bracton's history came on
Sunday morning, November 10, 1608.
Standing before all the judges of England
and the Barons of the Exchequer, Coke
intrepidly quoted the most famous line in
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final verdict on the influence of canon and civil
this sentence, which can be found in at least
two different places in his works: "It supplied
a method of reasoning upon matters legal, and a
power to create a technical language and techni-
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Bracton to James I, face to face: "Quod
Rex non debet esse sub homine, sed sub
Deo et lege." 151
Bracton seems to have had little direct
influence on the formation of the higher
law theories in the American colonies prior
to the Revolution. We do know that in
1775 a Mr. Stone argued before the Court
of Common Council that Parliament was
inferior to law, and quoted instances from
Bracton, Fortescue, Coke, and Blackstone
to support his opinion.19 More importantly, the great controversialist James Otis
cited Bracton in his address to Governor
Bernard in the Council Chamber late in
December, 1765.20 Other instances would
doubtless be adduced, but it was to the
fully developed theories of men like Locke
that the colonial theorists turned for their
chief support, not to Bracton.
Historical Background
Before passing to the text of Bracton
itself, it may be well to recall a few of the
major developments and events in English
history from the Norman Conquest to the
death of Bracton, a span of almost exactly
two centuries. During this period, the
royal household evolved from the simple
and almost familial forms we see in the
Bayeux tapestry into the threefold division
of Chapel, Hall, and Chamber, and finally
into the still more specialized institutions
of the Exchequer, the Chancery, and the
18 Cf.
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Later in the same year they quarreled over
the punishment of criminal clerks. In January, 1164, the king called together at
Clarendon the whole body of the bishops
and barons, and commanded Becket to
abide by the customs in use under Henry I.
Becket refused, and the Constitutions of
Clarendon were thereupon drafted, purportedly as a statement of the usages of
Henry I on the disputed points. These
involved, among others, questions of advowson and presentation, the trial of laymen for spiritual offenses, the license of
the clergy to go abroad, ecclesiastical appeals, the baronial duties of prelates, and
election to bishoprics and abbacies. Becket
reluctantly and indecisively accepted the
Constitutions, but then immediately sought
the forgiveness of the pope for having betrayed the interests of the Church.
Deeply offended, the king summoned
Becket by a common writ to a council at
Northampton in October, 1164, and demanded that Becket produce the accounts
of the chancery. (The twelfth century, it
21
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Wardrobe. The King in Council was the
ruler of the land; only the beginnings of
Parliament were visible.2 1 Of the many
important political events with which Bracton must have been familiar, two, it might
be thought, must surely have influenced
greatly his concept of the king and the law:
the martyrdom of Becket in 1170 and the
grant of Magna Carta in 1215.
Henry II's difficulties with Becket began
2
in 1163 over a question of taxation.1
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seems, was already adept at using the internal revenue laws to trap political enemies.) The archbishop fled to France,
where he stayed in exile for six years.
During this period, king and archbishop
engaged in endless intrigues against each
other. But in 1170, after the coronation
during Henry II's own lifetime of his son,
Henry III, by Roger of York, the king
found himself driven to the wall.
Becket claimed that Roger's intrusion
violated the rights of Canterbury, of the
English Church, and of Christianity itself.
Louis VI, indignant at the fact that his
daughter, Henry Ill's wife, had not been
crowned with her husband, urged the pope
to put England under interdict. This opposition proved too strong. Henry II hastened to France, made peace with Becket,
and authorized his return. When Becket
did return in December, he excommunicated the opposing bishops, thus provoking
the king to his fatal wish. Becket was
murdered in his cathedral on the 29th of
December, 1170.23
The bloody death of Becket was widely
believed to be the hest of the king. In a
land where the Faith was still centuries
from its eradication, Henry II had no
choice. He submitted to the papal representatives in 1172, denying under oath any
complicity in the death of Becket, and
renouncing the Constitutions of Clarendon.
With so impressive a precedent in his
mind, it is somewhat surprising to find
Bracton making so sharp a distinction between regnum and sacerdotium that conflict between the two seems impossible.
23 Stubbs has a somewhat different point of
view: Becket "expiated his imprudent and unchristian violence by a cruel dealth." I CON512 (6th
STITUTIONAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND
ed. 1897).

Speaking of the necessity of jurisdiction
over a controversy, he says simply:
There are spiritual cases in which a temporal judge has authority neither to decide
nor to command execution of the judgment, since he does not have authority
to enforce his decision. For in these cases
the right to decide belongs to ecclesiastical
judges, who govern and protect the spiritual order [sacerdotium]. There are also
temporal cases, in which the right to decide belongs to the kings and to the leaders
who defend the temporal order [regnum]
and in which ecclesiastical judges should
not intervene (since their rights or spheres
of jurisdiction are limited and separate)
unless the case be such that one sword
should help the other. For there is a great
difference between the spiritual and the
temporal orders. But since the government of the spiritual order in no way pertains to this treatise, I shall now consider
matters pertaining to the temporal order,
and, first of all, to whom it belongs, first
and foremost, in terms of duty and au24
thority, to pass judgment.
Except for the comment that ecclesiastical
judges should stay clear of cases in the
jurisdiction of the temporal judges, Bracton does not suggest the enormous complexity of the relationships between the
spiritual and the temporal courts. Still
more curiously, the one exception he makes
to the rule of non-intervention is the situation in which the spiritual sword should
come to the aid of the temporal. It is perhaps worth remarking that Bracton uses
the imagery of the swords, which derives
from a Gospel incident, not the two "powers" of Pope Gelasius.23 Apparently, either
24 Folio [hereinafter cited as f.] 107, 2 WOOD304 (1922). The translation is my own.
21Gelasius I, Duo quippe sunt (494), CHURCH
AND STATE THROUGH THE CENTURIES 11 (ed.
Ehler and Morrall 1954).

BINE
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the spiritual and temporal courts were
meshing smoothly at the time Bracton
wrote his treatise, or he feared that entrance into a discussion of their interrelationships would distract him from the
mighty and still unfinished task of setting
forth the laws and customs enforced in the
26
temporal royal courts.
The story of Magna Carta is too familiar
to need repetition here.2 7 Owing, however,
to the tremendous importance which this
document was to acquire in the constitutional controversies of the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries, it is important to keep
Magna Carta in mind while reading Bracton. To judge from what little he has to
say of it, the charter was certainly not regarded by him as a document of fundamental constitutional importance. So far
from being the cornerstone of his doctrine
that the king is subject to law, it seems to
be opposed to another equally fundamental
doctrine of Bracton's that the king is not
subject to any man.
Some commentators have detected an
echo in Bracton of the famous provisions
of chapter 61 of Magna Carta.2 1 Under
this chapter, the barons were to choose
twenty-five from among their number to
26
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act as a committee of vigilantes for the observance of the charter. If any four of the
barons were notified of a transgression by
the king or one of his officers, they were
to petition the king for redress. If he did
not repair the injury within forty days, the
four barons were to refer the matter to
the whole committee of twenty-five, and
then the committee, "together with the
community of the whole land," should distress and distrain the king in all possible
ways, only saving harmless the persons of
the king, his queen, and their children.
The passage in Bracton which some
have supposed to reflect this concept in
Magna Carta occurs in a section where
Bracton is developing the rule that the
king's justices cannot interpret or annul
royal charters. To the objection that this
may leave one of the litigants without any
remedy against injury by the king save the
judgment of the living God, the text replies:
The king has a superior, namely God. Also
the law, through which he was made king.
Also, his council, namely the earls and
barons, since the earls are so called because they are companions of the king,
and he that has a companion has a teacher.
If, therefore, the king is unbridled, that
is, lawless, they ought to put a bridle on
him, unless they themselves are unbridled
like the king. In that case, the subjects will
cry out and say: "Lord Jesus, constrain
their jaws with rein and bridle." And the
Lord will reply to them: "I shall call out

against them a distant nation, strong and
unknown, whose language they shall not
understand; and this people will destroy
them and tear them up by the roots from
the land; and they shall be judged by this
people, because they were unwilling to
judge their own subjects justly." And
finally, the Lord will send them, bound
hand and foot, into the fiery furnace and

HIGHER LAW

exterior darkness, where there shall be
29
weeping and gnashing of teeth.
The most serious objection against understanding this passage in the sense of a
Bractonian subordination of the king
to his council is that it is far from
certain that Bracton wrote it. Of all the
addiciones in the text, this is the most
famous and controversial.8 0 Whether, however, it is from the hand of Bracton or
not, the sense of the passage seems far
removed from that of chapter 61 of Magna
Carta. It seems likely that there is a deliberate play on three words: comites,
socii, and magister. If socius is taken in
the sense of "partner," the earls share in
kingship with the king and are collectively
his master. If socius is taken in the sense
of "companion," the earls derive their
name from their accompaniment (comitatus) of the king and are collectively or individually his teacher. The double meaning of magister, teacher or master, can be
resolved only by an election between the
two meanings of socius, partner or companion. 31 The only part of the passage
29F. 34a-b, 2 WOODBINE 110 (1922). The
translation is mine. The scriptural references at
the end of the passage seem to be dependent on
Psalms 31:9; Jeremiah 5:15 ff.; Ezechiel 17:9;
Matthew 13:40 & 22:13; but none of the citations
is exact.
30 KANTOROwIcz, BRACTONIAN PROBLEMS 5052 (1941), not only accepts the genuineness of
this addicio, but comments: "No passage more
genuinely Bractonian stands in the whole treatise
than these prophetic words, which, if rightly
read and understood, contain the clue to centuries of English constitutional life, legal, moral,
and political." The weight of scholarly authority,
however, still lies with Maitland's original judgment of spuriousness; see PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 234 n. 5

(5th ed. 1956); MCILWAIN, CONSTITUTIONALISM
ANCIENT AND MODERN 69 (rev. ed. 1947).
81 If the passage is from Bracton, it seems

clear from f. 5b, 2

WOODBINE

32 (1922), that

which is manifestly in conflict with the rest
of Bracton is the clear statement that the
curia is superior to the king. This is
enough, however, to instill permanent
doubt of its authenticity, despite the thoroughly Bractonian imagery of the bridle
and of the appeal to divine justice as the
last resort against the king and nobles.
Bracton and the Natural Law
At the outset of his treatise, Bracton is
concerned with the justification of the title
leges as applied to unwritten English laws.
He contrasts the situation in England with
what he believes to be the otherwise universal practice of reducing ius et leges to
writing. But, he says, it will not be absurd
to call English laws leges, even though
they are not written, because everything
has the force of law (lex) which has been
justly determined and approved through
the counsel and consent of the nobles
(magnates), the common engagement of
society (res publica), and the prior authority of the king or emperor. He then contrasts lex with consuetudo; the essential
difference is that a lex derives its authority
from the joint action of king, nobles, and
society, whereas a consuetudo derives its
authority from the practice in a particular
place. It is implied, but not stated, that
leges bind everywhere alike; it is stated
explicitly that consuetudines bind only in
the places where they arise.
After these fundamental distinctions,
Bracton explains his purpose in writing the
treatise. He then returns to the nature of
English laws and customs.32 Those which
have been approved by the consent of the
users and confirmed by the oath of the king
cannot be changed or destroyed without
the proper sense of socius is "companion" and
of magister "teacher."
s2 F. lb, 2 WOODBIE 21 (1922).

8
the common consent of all those by whose
counsel and consent they were promulgated. They can, however, be changed to the
advantage of the subjects without their
consent, because improvement is not destruction. At this point Bracton digresses

on the qualifications of good judges and
the punishment of evil ones. When he returns to the nature of laws and customs, he
seems to begin his subject afresh.3 3 He
takes Papinian's set of definitions of lex
from the Digest, but does not interpret
4
them in the light of English government .
In this section he is borrowing heavily
from Azo,"3

and is far less coherent than

at the beginning of the treatise.
Bracton continues with a discussion of
iustitia, ius, iuris prudentia, aequitas, iuris
praecepta, and the distincton between ius

publicum and ius privatum. This brings
him to the ius naturale, for ius privatum
is composed of three classes of rules: ex

naturalibus praeceptis aut gentium aut
civilibus.36 We would expect a list of the

"natural precepts" to follow; but Bracton

surprises the reader by developing the con37
cept of ius naturale in the following way:
"Natural law" is understood in many
senses: (1) a certain instinctive motion
coming from the nature of an animal, by
which motion every animal is impelled to
do some certain thing. This is one of the
senses of the maxim: "lus naturale est quod
natura, id est ipse deus, docuit omnia ani2a, 2 WOODBINE 22 (1922).
1.3. 1 (ed. Krueger and Mommsen 1911).
35 MAITLAND, BRACTON AND Azo 18-33 (1895).
33 F.

3'D.

36F. 3b, 2 WOODBINE 26

(1922).

36-4, 2 WOODBINE 26-27 (1922). The
translation is mine. Throughout I have rendered
ius naturale as natural law. On the difference
between ius and lex and the problems this distinction raised for Bracton, see MAITLAND, BRAC37F.

TON AND

Azo 29-33 (1895).
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malia." Understood in the sense mentioned, quod in the maxim is in the accusative case and natura in the nominative.38 In the second sense of the maxim,
quod is taken in the nominative case, so
that the maxim means: Natural law is
that law which has instructed all animals
through their nature, that is, through the
instinct of their nature. In this sense of
the maxim, natura is read in the ablative
case. And this is why it is said that the
first movements [of our appetites] are not
in our power, but the second are. If, therefore, we take only pleasure and delight in
an object, but nothing more, we commit a
venial sin. But if we go further and decide
to put our base thoughts into practice, then
this decision is called the third movement,
and we commit a mortal sin. It should
also be noted that these movements are
called "natural law" with respect to all
creatures, rational and irrational, for the
same reason that the will is called "justice"
with respect only to rational creatures.
There are some, indeed, who say that
neither the will nor these movements can
properly be termed natural law or the law
of nations, because they are simply matters
of fact. I answer 39 that the will and these
movements are instruments by which natural law and justice disclose and reveal
their effect. For it is in the soul that virtues and rights reside.
Bracton concludes his discussion of the
natural law by giving two other definitions,
which, however, he does not develop and
to which he apparently attributes little importance. 0 Since the passage translated
represents the whole substance of Brac38 The maxim then means:
Natural law is
what nature, that is, God Himself, has taught
all animals.
391 have departed from Woodbine's punctuation at this point.
40 "Et illud forte apertius dicetur, ius naturale
esse debitum quoddam quod natura cuilibet repraesentat. Item dicitur ius naturale ius aequissimum, cum dicitur lapsos minores secundum
aequitatem restitui"; f. 4, 2 WOODaINE 27 (1922).
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ton's exposition of the natural law (he does
not return to it again except in brief and
scattered comments), it is necessary to pay
particularly close attention to what he has
said and to the way in which he has utilized
his sources.
One has only to glance at Maitland's
parallel columns to see how closely and
yet how selectively Bracton has followed
1
Azo's explanation of the ius naturale.Almost every word in Bracton is in Azo,
but far from everything in Azo is in Bracton. The second definition given by Bracton follows immediately in both Bracton
and Azo upon the passage translated above;
but between the second and third definition the following passage occurs in Azo
but has deliberately been omitted by Bracton:
Natural law is also predicated sometimes
of the law common to all which has been
established by human efforts, and so
the law of nations may be styled the natural law. Again, as we read in the Decreturn, the natural law is the contents of
42
the Mosaic Law or the Gospel.
Azo continues with still another definition,
concerned with the equitable restoration
of minors to their rights, which Bracton
selects as his third definition and tacks
on immediately to the second. It is obvious that Bracton has deliberately excluded
the law of nations 43 and the content of
revelation from his concept of natural law.
41 MAITLAND, BRACTON AND
42

Azo 32-39 (1895).

Id. at 36.

43 Bracton reinforces the exclusion by following Azo again in distinguishing the natural law
(common to all animals) from the law of nations (common to all men); f. 4, 2 WOODBINE 27
(1922). But see f. 8b, 2 Woodbine 42, where

It is difficult, therefore, to agree with Maitland's statement that Bracton has copied
"his account of ius naturale from Azo...
without adding anything or omitting
much."' 4 The omission may be small in
terms of length, but it is cardinal in terms
of significance. Bracton was too good a
lawyer to call human laws "natural" without qualification; too good a theologian to
identify nature and revelation.
One puzzle which seems impossible of
resolution is why Bracton did accept both
the second and third definitions of natural
law. They give the term thoroughly equivocal meanings: the second conceives it in
terms of duty, and the third in terms of a
rule of law. Perhaps Bracton simply wished
to inform his readers, most of them presumably students, 45 that the term did have
equivocal meanings in legal usage. This
explanation, however, fails to account for
the deliberate omission of other meanings
equally represented in Bracton's model.
Perhaps the second and third definitions
would not have survived if Bracton had
completed revision of his text.
What is certain is that Bracton seized on
the definition of ius naturale in terms of
the spontaneous, instinctive movements of
animal appetites as his favored concept of
the natural law. Why he did so is not certain. Perhaps it was in order to teach his
readers some moral theology: the distinction between primus, secundus, and tertius
motus is as fundamental today as it was
in the thirteenth century. Stated briefly,
the doctrine is as follows. The spontanerace."

This discrepancy with his earlier sharp

distinction between ius naturale and ius gentium

Bracton identifies ius naturale with the ius is one of the more startling inconsistencies in
Bracton's treatise.
gentium, and begins his discussion of the ac44 MAITLAND, BRACTON AND Azo 39 (1895).
quisition of things with this "older" law, "which
45F. lb, 2 WOODBINE 20 (1922).
nature brought forth together with the human
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ous, involuntary movements of appetite
and the pleasure or pain which accompanies them are never sinful. They flow
from the God-given nature of animals, including men, and are therefore naturally
good. In the case of men, they are also
morally indifferent. These movements are
the primus motus of Bracton, the motus
primoprimi of the later Scholastics. When,
however, these movements persist on the
level of consciousness, some deliberate response by men will be made. This response
may be limited to deliberate complacency
in the appetite (secundus motus), or it may
proceed to a decision to satisfy the appetite (tertius motus). If the appetite is
"base" because its satisfaction is forbidden,
Bracton, following Azo, holds that deliberate complacency is only a venial sin, but
that decision to satisfy is a mortal sin.
Stated as baldly as that, Bracton's doctrine
is not in harmony with the mainstream of
medieval moral theology, but it must be
remembered that he was not attempting to
explain the point fully. Bracton surely
knew that there were venially, as well as
mortally, forbidden satisfactions. What he
may not have known, however, is that
there are some mortally forbidden deliberate complacencies: it would be centuries,
for example, before all theologians would
agree that deliberate complacency in any
sexual appetite whose satisfaction was forbidden would be a mortal sin.
Bracton's explanation of the natural law
may leave some questions in our minds,
but it surely answers one in unequivocal
fashion. If there is a higher law doctrine in
Bracton, it is not in terms of the natural
law. This is all the more remarkable because the books at his disposal, especially
the Institutes, put ready to his hand the
raw materials of the Stoic concept of the
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natural law. By virtually limiting the meaning of ius naturale to the spontaneous motions of animal appetite, Bracton deliberately refused to identify the law to which
the king should be subject with the natural
law of Greece and Rome.
God, the King and the Law
But the king is subject to the law, and
to God. At the very outset of his treatise,
Bracton is at pains to show the relationship
between the coercive power of the king
and law:
For a king to rule rightly, two things are
necessary: arms and laws. These two
things make it possible to govern rightly
both during war and during peace. For
each of these things needs the help of the
other, so that military affairs can be handled securely and the laws
can be preserved
46
with the help of arms.
Nothing could demonstrate more conclusively the legal realism of Bracton. A legal
system without sufficient coercive power to
compel obedience is as repugnant to his
thought as the lawless use of military
power.
Bracton delays development of his concept of the king until he has disposed of
the general concepts of jurisprudence. Even
when he begins his discussion of persons,
the first great division of his treatise, he
does not start with the king but with the
distinction between freedom and slavery.
After touching briefly on certain other distinctions between men, he lists the classes
of those who are subject to the king and
thus comes to the king himself. The transition is forceful: "Under the king, therefore, we find free men and slaves and subjects to his authority: indeed, everyone is
subject to him and he to no one save God
alone. ,14
46
47

F. 1, 2 WOODBINE 19 (1922).
F. 5b, 2 WooDBINE 33 (1922).
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Bracton continues with this explanation
of the king's superiority to all human authority:
The king has no peer in his kingdom;
otherwise he would lose the power to command, since peer has no power over peer.
Much less, then, is anyone above or more
powerful than the king; for thus he would
be inferior to his subjects, and inferiors
cannot be peers of the more powerful. The
king himself ought not to be subject to any
man but rather to God and the law, because the law makes the king. The king,
therefore, should attribute to the law what
the law attributes to him, domination and
power. For there is no king where will
rules and not law.' s
This passage is pure Bracton; he is not
copying or even imitating Azo or Glanvill.
The king's superiority to all is founded on
his right to command all; the king's subjection to law is based on the concept that he
was made king by law in order to rule,
not to tyrannize. But what of the king's
subjection to God? Bracton continues immediately with a beautiful and thoroughly
Christian passage:
That the king should be subject to the
law, since he is the vicar of God, becomes
manifest from the example of Christ, whose
vicar he is on earth. The faithful mercy
of God, although innumerable ways were
open to it for the recovery of the human
race, chose a method in preference to all
others which accomplished the destruction
of the devil's work not by sheer force but
through justice. He chose to subject Himself to the law in order to redeem those who
were subject to the law. He chose not to
use strength, but judgment. 49 So, too, the
4 Ibid.
49 "Noluit enim uti viribus sed iudicio." Mait-

land's paraphrase hits the point exactly: "Christ,
when he desired to 'recover' the human race,
preferred 'due process of law' to a lawless selfhelp: . . . Even Satan was not to be disseised
BRACTON AND Azo 65 (1895).

sine iudicio.'"

blessed Mother of God, the Virgin Mary,
our Lord's mother, was by singular privilege above the law, but, in order to give
an example of humility, subjected herself
to the rules of the law.

In imitation of Christ and His mother,
Mary, the king ought to be greater than
anyone else in the kingdom in displaying
justice,50 and he ought to act like the least
of his subjects when he has recourse himself to his courts. Bracton then faces the
critical question: What if the king refuses
to remedy a grievance against himself? He
answers: "Since no writ runs against the
king, the proper way to seek redress is by
petitioning him to correct and amend what
he has done. If he does not do so, it is sufficient for a penalty that he will someday
meet God the avenger."'

1

The idea of divine vengeance is extremly
strong in Bracton. He applies it equally to
the king and to his judges.5 2 The vengeance
50 So intimate is the connection between justice and the king that Bracton does not hesitate
to say later, f. 55b, 2 WOODBINE 167 (1922):
"Those things which concern jurisdiction and
peace, and those which belong to justice and
peace, belong to no man but only to the crown
and the royal office; they cannot be separated
from the crown, because they make the crown
itself. For the crown is the doing of justice
and judgment, and the keeping of the peace,
without which the crown cannot exist or survive." See also f. 107b, 2 WOODBINE 305:

The

king is created and elected precisely to do justice
to all.
51 F. 5b-6, 2 WOODBINE 33 (1922).

Bracton

returns to the same question at f. 56b, 2 WOODBINE 169, and insists again that a request to the
king to correct a deed "magis voluntarium quam
iustum" is the only remedy in this life. On the
general problem of proceedings against the Crown
in the time of Bracton, see Ehrlich, Proceedings Against The Crown (1216-1377), in 6 OxFORD STUDIES

IN

SOCIAL AND

LEGAL

HISTORY

(1921).
52 The most notable example is at f. 2a, 2
WOODBINE 21-22 (1922), a "fervid sermon" in
Maitland's phrase, BRACTON AND AZO 17 (1895)
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will be all the more terrible because of the
intimate relationship between the king and
God. The royal throne is, as it were, God's
throne.5 3 The royal subjects are the people of God. 54 The king stands in the place
of Christ; he is the vicar and servant of
55
God.
It is, therefore, in the New Testament
doctrine 6 of the divine origin of political
authority that Bracton finds both the dignity
of the king and the one sure recourse
against abuse of his power. To the modern
mind, this is an unsatisfactory solution to
the constitutional problem. To the Christian mind, it is only an incomplete solution.
Seven centuries of political experience have
made us more ingenious than Bracton, but
not wise or virtuous enough to prevent the
excesses of Hitler and Stalin.
Thomas Aquinas and the Natural Law
As we have seen, Bracton's most characteristic concept of the natural law is that
of the appetites which God Himself has implanted in the natures of all animals. It is
not to this "law" that the king should be
subject, but to the laws of his own kingdom. Infidelity to these laws is a breach
of that justice for whose administration on
this earth he has been elected God's vicar.
Abuse of the divine office will inevitably
entail divine vengeance. It is to the justice
of God that a subject must look for a remedy against the injustice of a king.
53F. lb (twice),

54 F. 5b,

2 WOODBINE 20, 21 (1922).

2 WOODBINE 32; f. 108, 2 WOODBNE

307.
55F. lb, 5b, 55b, 107ab, 2 WOODBINE 20, 33,
166, 305 (thrice).
56Matthew 22:21 (and its parallels, Mark
12:17, Luke 20:25); Matthew 23:1-3; John
18:36, 19:11; Romans 13:1-7; 1 Timothy 2:1-2;
Titus 3:1; 1 Peter 2: 13-17.
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When we turn to the works of Thomas
Aquinas, we find a different concern and
a different spirit. Thomas is no royal judge,
seeking to introduce reason and order into
a mass of civil laws; he is a theologian, attempting to understand the nature of law
in all its ramifications. Where Bracton
sought unity for the laws of a kingdom,
Thomas sought unity for the laws of a
universe.
Thomas found this unity in the concept
of reason as the essence of law. Laws direct human activities toward certain goals.
Direction of anything towards an end is a
function of reason; for it is reason that
perceives the connection between the means
and the end. It is impossible, therefore,
57
to have a law without reason.
The ultimate end to which all laws are
directed must be the ultimate end of man
himself, which is bliss or happiness. Man,
however, does not exist in isolation, but in
the community of mankind. The proper
object of law, therefore, is the common
good. 8 Since the right to direct anything
to an end belongs to him to whom the end
itself belongs, and since the end of law,
the common good, belongs to all, it follows
that the making of law belongs either to
the whole people or to someone who has
57 SUMMA THEOLOGICA I-11, q. 90, art. 1. The

full scope of St.
can be gathered
his writings. I
presentation of

Thomas' doctrine on natural law
only from an examination of all
have limited myself here to a
his most formal treatment in

the SUMMA THEOLOGICA,

because

this is more

than sufficient to illustrate the difference between his point of view and Bracton's. For
a more comprehensive understanding of St.
Thomas' legal thought, the following works by
d'Entreves are particularly helpful: THE MEDIEVAL

CONTRIBUTION

TO

POLITICAL

THOUGHT

(1939); ACQuINAS: SELECTED POLITICAL WRITINGS (1947); NATURAL LAW (1951).
58 SUMMA THEOLOGICA, I-I, q. 90, art. 2.
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charge of them.5 9 For a law to be effective,
it is obvious that its intended subjects must
know of its existence; promulgation is necessary for a law to obtain its force. The
definition of law is, therefore, "an ordinance of reason for the common good,
made by him who has care of the community, and promulgated."O
With this foundation firmly laid, Thomas
proceeds to consider the various kinds of
law: eternal, natural, human, and divine.
The eternal law is the very idea of the government of things in God, the ruler of the
universe.61 In order for this idea to be effective, God has imprinted it in the natures
of His creatures by giving them inclinations
towards their proper acts and ends. In the
case of man, this imprint is of special excellence: man not only has an inclination
towards his true end, but he enjoys the
light of natural reason, by which he dis62
cerns good and evil.
This discernment operates on the basis
of certain general and indemonstrable principles which God has implanted in human
reason. Just as the speculative reason, ordered to truth, has its indemonstrable principles, so the practical reason, ordered to
the good, has its innate and unprovable
laws. These general principles of the practical intellect do not give man a knowledge
of the proper solutions of individual cases,
but they serve as guides for the acquisition
of such knowledge. When men, in the light
of these principles, agree on the determination of a particular rule of conduct, they
can erect the rule into a law, providing they
have legislative authority and the rule is

reasonable, ordained to the common good,
and promulgated. Such laws, made by men
in the light of the natural law, constitute
63
the body of human laws.
For St. Thomas, then, unlike Bracton,
the natural law in the case of rational creatures is not the spontaneous impulse of appetite, but the light of practical reason.
God has not left this reason formless, but
has given it a participation in His own idea
of the government of the world through the
medium of certain general and indemonstrable principles of right and wrong. These
principles must govern the determinations
men make in their particular political societies; but they only govern these determinations, they do not substitute for them.
Thomas Aquinas and the Higher Law
It is obvious, therefore, that for Aquinas
the higher law and the natural law are one
and the same. If a law made by men violates the fundamental principles of the natural law, it has no binding force. What,
however, is to be done when human governments disregard the natural law?
St. Thomas' most detailed answer to
this question is to be found in his unfinished treatise on kingship.6 4 His first point
is that if the tyranny of the ruler is not excessive, it is "more expedient to tolerate
the milder tyranny for a while than, by acting against the tyrant, to become involved
in many perils more grievous than the
tyranny itself. '6 5 The greatest peril, says
St. Thomas, in the suppression of a tyranny
is that the victorious party may prove still
63

59 Id., I-I, q. 90, art. 3.
60 Id., I-1I, q. 90, art. 4.
61 Id., 1-1I, q. 91, art. 1.
62 Id., I-II, q. 91, art. 2.

64

Id., I-I, q. 91, art. 3.

ACQUINAS,
ON KINGSHIP:
To THE KING
OF CYPRUS (ed. Eschmann, trans]. Phelan 1949)
[hereinafter cited as Eschmann-Phelan].
65 Eschmann-Phelan 24 (1949).

8

more tyrannical in order to maintain its
power. One thinks today of Hungary and
Cuba.
St. Thomas then considers the morality
of tryannicide. He mentions the example
of Aioth in the Old Testament, who slew
Eglon, King of Moab.6 6 Against this example, however, he sets the teaching of St.
Peter that obedience is due not only to
good and gentle masters, but also to the
froward. 67 Thomas also cites the example
of the Christian martyrs, especially of the
Theban legion, which did not resist, armed
though it was. 68
In any event, tyrannicide is not an action to be undertaken by private authority.
Only the public authority which has established the tyrant king may depose him. The
deposition of a tyrant is not a lawless breach
of the loyalty which a people owes to its
king, because the tyrant, by definition, has
already broken the covenant with his people by not acting faithfully in his office as
king.6 9
Suppose, however, that the ruler is not
elected by the people, but appointed by a
higher authority. The proper remedy for
the wickedness of such a ruler is appeal to
the higher authority. Thomas cites the example of the Jews' complaint against
Archelaus to the Roman Emperor.7 0
Finally, if the situation has so degenerated that no human aid whatsoever is available against the tyrant, "recourse must be
had to God, the King of all, Who is a
helper in due time in tribulation." God
may turn the cruel heart of the tyrant to
mildness, as He did in the case of Assuerus
66

Judges 3:14 ff.
1 Peter 2:18-19.
68 Eschman-Phelan 26 (1949).
69Id. at 27.
70 ld. at 28.
67

CATHOLIC LAWYER,

SUMMER

1962

and of Nabuchodonosor. If God does not
choose to convert the heart of the tyrant,
He can overturn his power, as He did with
Pharaoh. To deserve this deliverance by
God, however, the people must desist from
sin. The rule of wicked men is a divine
71

punishment for human sinfulness.

For St. Thomas, then, recourse to God
is the ultimate, but not the only, remedy
against governmental lawlessness. Since
government depends, in part, on a pact
between king and people, breach of the
covenant by the king gives a right to the
people to terminate his authority. This
right must be prudently exercised, for the
suppression of one tyrant by no means prevents the succession of another. Moreover,
the right must be exercised by the people,
not by private individuals. Thomas does
not furnish an institutional scheme by which
the people may act as a people against their
government; he is thinking of rebellion,
not a separation of powers.
The ultimate reliance on divine power,
it should be noted, is not a reliance simply
on the divine vengeance. God may change
the heart of the ruler; God may take away
his power even in this world. The people
must, however, remember that it is not
the sinfulness only of the tyrant which displeases God; their own sinfulness may have
brought the tyranny upon them.
Conclusion
In Bracton and in St. Thomas the doctrine of a higher law to which all political
authority is subject is a fundamental principle of political philosophy. For Bracton,
this higher law is not the natural law, but
71

Eschmann-Phelan 28-29 (1949).
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